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Abstract: While criminologists have for some time examined state and corporate crime as separate entities, the 
concept of state-corporate crime highlighting joint government and private corporate action causing criminal harm is 
a recent area of study with relatively few published case studies (Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2000).  This paper focuses 
on state-corporate crime at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) in Paducah, Kentucky, and contributes 
to the study of state-corporate crime in three ways: (1) it adds a new case study to a field in which there are few 
published accounts, (2) it assesses the utility of Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998) integrated theoretical framework of 
state-corporate crime by applying it to understanding harms at PGDP, and (3) it demonstrates how the state role in 
state-corporate crime can evolve from that of instigator to facilitator.  PGDP is an especially important case study 
in the field of state-corporate crime because it constitutes a rare instance in which the federal government has both 
acknowledged and apologized for its role in harms caused to plant workers and the environment.
Keywords:  State-corporate crime; Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Introduction
Nuclear workers’ compensation is a national 
debt long due to our Cold War veterans who’ve 
paid the highest price possible for their service.
— Energy Secretary Bill Richardson 
(Carroll, 2000b)
 A USA Today series, “Poisoned Workers and 
Poisoned Places” (Eisler, 2000), brought public atten-
tion to the ever-growing evidence of government and 
corporate misconduct in the nuclear industry.  The series 
described how the U.S. government hired companies to 
process nuclear materials, and estimated that about 550 
plants may have conducted work related to the govern-
ment’s nuclear program.  The series further described 
how health and environmental problems at these facilities 
were kept secret by government officials and company 
executives (Eisler, 2000).  This paper examines activi-
ties and their resulting harms at one nuclear facility, the 
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP), near Paducah, 
Kentucky.  Our examination of the activities and harms at 
PGDP that led to Energy Secretary Richardson’s apology 
to plant employees on behalf of the federal government 
leads us to classify the harms at PGDP as state-corporate 
crime.  PGDP activities demonstrate the harm potential 
from state-corporate crime and necessity of continued 
study in this area; at a time when federal government is 
considering renewed and increased reliance on nuclear 
power (e.g., Baker and Mufson, 2006), examination of 
harms stemming from the nuclear industry is of particular 
importance.  This paper contributes to the study of state-
corporate crime in three ways: (1) it adds a new case study 
to a field in which there are few published accounts, (2) 
it assesses the utility of Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998) 
integrated theoretical framework of state-corporate crime 
through application to understanding harms at PGDP, and 
(3) it demonstrates how the state role in state-corporate 
crime can change over time from that of instigator to 
facilitator.
Traditional Criminological Research 
and State-Corporate Crime
 Historically, criminological research has focused 
on law violations by individuals, neglecting state activi-
ties performed in pursuit of apparently legitimate goals. 
Official sources of crime data reinforce this traditional 
criminological focus by emphasizing individual acts and 
one-on-one harms (Reiman, 2001).  Recently, however, 
state-corporate crime has emerged as an area of research 
recognizing the need to extend traditional criminological 
focus beyond the individual’s violation of law (Kramer, 
1992; Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1993; Kauzlarich and 
Kramer, 1998; Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2000).
 The importance of state-corporate crime as a research 
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focus is highlighted by damage described in the few stud-
ies of state-corporate crime published to date (Kramer, 
1992; Aulette and Michalowski, 1993; Kauzlarich and 
Kramer, 1993; Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2000); more-
over, the extent of harm from state-corporate crime likely 
extends beyond injury and financial cost to a general loss 
of confidence in government.  Examination of state-cor-
porate crime also reveals a general lack of preparation for 
dealing with disaster; although technology has developed 
at breakneck speed, a parallel development of safety and 
rescue technology has not occurred.  History is replete 
with examples, all too often ignored, of what happens 
when technology goes awry (Perrow, 1984).
 The complexity of state-corporate crime arises from 
the nature of the offenses; unlike traditional “street crime,” 
state-corporate crime is not characterized by the intent of 
a single actor to violate law for personal pleasure or gain. 
Criminal actions by the state often lack an obvious vic-
tim, and diffusion of responsibility arising from corporate 
structure and involvement of multiple actors makes the 
task of attributing criminal responsibility difficult (Stone, 
1978; Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Becker, Jipson, and 
Bruce, 2000).  Furthermore, sufficient understanding of 
state-corporate crime cannot be gained through studying 
individual actors; one must also consider broader organi-
zational and societal factors.  The integrated theoretical 
framework proposed by Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998), 
proposes analysis of events at institutional, organization-
al, and interactional levels and, we believe, is especially 
useful for analysis of state-corporate crime.
State-Corporate Crime Defined
 Kramer, Michalowski, and Kauzlarich (2002) de-
scribe the origins, development and status of state-cor-
porate crime theory.  Kramer et al. note that the study of 
state-corporate crime emerged from earlier research on 
white-collar and organizational offending.  In his study 
of the 1986 space shuttle Challenger disaster, Kramer 
(1992) found the disaster could best be explained by 
considering the interaction between the state and a cor-
poration, specifically “(t)he National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA), a governmental agency, 
and Morton Thiokol, Inc., a private business corporation” 
(Kramer et al., 2002:268).  Kramer recognized existing 
research had failed to examine the longstanding relation-
ships between corporations and government that result 
in public harm.  While criminologists had studied crime 
by government and crime by private corporations these 
were effectively two separate research camps; Kramer’s 
Challenger shuttle disaster research brought the two 
camps together, revealing how a state-corporate relation-
ship can result in criminal harm.  Subsequent research 
revealed differences in the relationship between govern-
ment and corporation in state-corporate crime.  For ex-
ample, while Kramer (1992) demonstrated how the state 
can actively initiate a state-corporate relationship result-
ing in crime, Aulette and Michalowski’s (1993) study of a 
fire at Imperial Food Products in Hamlet, NC, that caused 
25 deaths and multiple injuries revealed a more passive 
governmental role in which failure to enforce regulations 
allowed a corporation to continue the deliberate violation 
of safety standards.  Recognition of differences in the 
state-corporate relationship has led to recognition of two 
distinct forms of state-corporate crime—state-initiated 
and state-facilitated:
State-initiated corporate crime (such as the 
Challenger explosion) occurs when corpora-
tions, employed by the government, engage in 
organizational deviance at the direction of, or 
with the tacit approval of, the government.  State-
facilitated state-corporate crime (such as the 
Imperial Food Products fire in Hamlet) occurs 
when government regulatory institutions fail to 
restrain deviant activities either because of di-
rect collusion between business and government 
or because they adhere to shared goals whose 
attainment would be hampered by aggressive 
regulation.  (Kramer et al., 2002:271-272)
 While this distinction between state-initiated and 
state-facilitated corporate crime is important, our ex-
amination of events at PGDP contributes to the study of 
state-corporate crime by demonstrating how evolving 
state behavior can transform the role of the state from 
that of instigator to facilitator of state-corporate crime; it 
is apparent that the state both initiated and subsequently 
facilitated illegal activities at PGDP through collusion 
with PGDP administrators to conceal harms to workers 
and prevent enforcement of safety regulations.
 An important issue for conducting research on 
state-corporate crime is whether organizations can be 
legitimately regarded as offenders or whether they are 
merely collections of individuals who ultimately exercise 
control over their own actions.  The history of criminol-
ogy is dominated by a focus on the individual as offender 
with theory directed at explaining individual criminality 
(Clinard and Yeager, 1980). Yet as we describe below, 
there has long been recognition that corporations operate 
as distinct entities and can legitimately be classified as 
offenders; this position is becoming more widely recog-
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nized by criminologists (Kauzlarich, 1995).
 Legally, corporations were first identified as actors 
punishable by criminal law in 1909 (Geis, 2005) when 
the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned in New York Central & 
Hudson River Railroad Company v United States that:
(t)here is a large class of offenses…wherein the 
crime consists in purposely doing the things 
prohibited by statute. In that class of crimes we 
see no good reason why corporations may not be 
held responsible for and charged with the knowl-
edge and purposes of their agents, acting within 
the authority conferred upon them… to give 
them immunity from all punishment because of 
the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation 
cannot commit a crime would virtually take away 
the only means of effectually controlling the 
subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed 
at [sic].  <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgibin/
getcase.pl?court=US&vol=212&invol=481>
 Sociologists have long recognized that industrial-
ization produced bureaucratic organizations comprising 
positions that shape employee behavior by requiring 
specific actions (e.g., Weber, 1947; Nelson, 1975; Hall, 
1987), and that corporate action has significant impacts 
upon society (e.g., Johnson and Douglas, 1978; Vaughan, 
1983; Hall, 1987).  A number of researchers argue that 
organizations should be regarded as actors in their own 
right.  Kramer et al. (2002) identify three reasons why or-
ganizations should be seen as “real social actors.”  First, 
organizations persist over time; specific positions within 
organizations persist and are filled by different people 
required to perform the same tasks, thus the general 
behavior of the organization persists.  Second, accepted 
organizational procedures and norms for conduct shape 
individual behavior.  Finally, organizational goals take 
precedence over those of individual workers.  Coleman 
(2002:103) elaborates upon the precedence of organiza-
tional goals over those of individual workers by describ-
ing “the irrelevance of persons.” He notes that organiza-
tions comprise positions, rather than unique individuals, 
and that what is needed is someone or something to fill 
a particular position.  Thus, if one person leaves an orga-
nization, cannot or will not perform required tasks, they 
are easily replaced by someone who can and will perform 
the tasks required by the overriding organizational goals. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, Coleman (2002) argues 
that as technology allows, an organizational position can 
just as adequately be filled by a machine capable of the 
required tasks as a person.  Furthermore, corporate goals, 
hierarchical structure that dilutes individual responsibility 
and helps conceal wrongdoing, and the characteristics of 
the arena in which a corporation operates all contribute to 
corporate criminality regardless of individual employees 
(Clinard and Yeager, 1980).  Finally, as noted by Coleman 
(1985:14) corporations can generate a tradition of crimi-
nal practices in pursuit of legitimate corporate goals, and 
while:
(i)ndividual actors must still carry out the crimi-
nal deeds, there is ample evidence to show that 
the attitudes and characteristics of the individual 
offenders are often of little importance.  Those 
who refuse to carry out the illegal activities 
demanded by their organization are simply re-
placed by others who will.
 We believe, then, that the behavior of organizations 
amounts to more than the collective actions of autono-
mous individuals and that organizations are a legitimate 
focus of criminological inquiry.
Methods
 The current research uses the case study approach 
(Berg, 2001), which has previously been used to ex-
amine state-corporate crime (Kramer, 1992; Aulette 
and Michalowski, 1993; Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1993; 
Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2000).  Specifically, we use 
what Stake (2000:437) calls an instrumental case study 
where “a particular case is examined mainly to provide 
insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization.  The 
case is of secondary interest; it plays a supportive role, 
and it facilitates our understanding of something else.” 
Thus, while description of events at PGDP is important 
and interesting, our goals include using this case to deter-
mine the usefulness of Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998)1 
integrated theoretical framework for explaining state-cor-
porate crime and to enhance understanding of this offense 
type.
 The nature of available data is of primary concern 
in qualitative research (Platt, 1981; Yin, 1994) and, 
as explained below, recent events have reduced ac-
cess to official documents on PGDP.  Our data sources 
include government reports and media archives.  Two 
newspaper archives indexing articles about PGDP were 
especially useful: The Washington Post archive, and The 
(Louisville) Courier-Journal archive.  We have used 
primary data whenever possible; however, problems in 
accessing certain information called for alternative data 
sources.  Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
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Department of Energy (DOE) has removed some reports 
from its website until they are deemed appropriate for 
public consumption.  While we obtained much data prior 
to this security measure, in some instances we have had 
to rely on secondary sources, such as media coverage, for 
additional information.  In other instances, we have used 
secondary reports when the news media asked impartial 
experts to evaluate technical data contained in DOE 
reports and releases.  It is important for the reader to un-
derstand why we relied in part on newspapers, rather than 
original sources, for some data; we are concerned with 
understanding the state-corporate relationship leading to 
harms at PGDP and following accepted practice in case 
study research (see Platt, 1981; Yin, 1994) have examined 
the most influential and informative documents.
History of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
 The United States began enriching uranium in the 
early 1940s to produce fissionable material for the atomic 
bomb (USEC, 2001).  The Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) eventually took control of the enrichment pro-
gram, and the first plant began operation in 1945 (USEC, 
2001).  In October 1950, the U.S. government announced 
that a new plant to produce enriched uranium for both 
nuclear power production and nuclear weapons would 
be located near Paducah, Kentucky (Office of Oversight, 
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000).  The decision 
to locate the plant near Paducah was popular among 
residents, as the area was experiencing a long period 
of economic hardship.  The community welcomed the 
plant and the resulting economic prosperity brought new 
residents.  The economic benefits were so far-reaching 
that “even the city’s brothel added a wing,” and Paducah 
became known locally as “Boomtown” (Malone, 2000a). 
The U.S. government’s decision to take advantage of 
economic need to foster community support for contro-
versial and dangerous activities is not without precedent 
(Bullard, 1993; Bullard, 2000; Pellow, 2002).
 Throughout its history PGDP has experienced 
changes in contractors, operators and regulators.  When 
PGDP began producing enriched uranium in 1952, the 
DOE contracted the Union Carbide Chemical Company 
to operate the plant (Office of Oversight, Environment, 
Safety and Health, 2000).  In 1984, the Martin Marietta 
Corporation replaced Union Carbide as the plant contrac-
tor (USEC, 2001).  In 1993, the United States Enrichment 
Corporation (USEC) leased the production facilities from 
the DOE and managed the plant.  USEC retained Martin 
Marietta, now the Lockheed Martin Corporation, as the 
plant contractor (USEC 2001).  In 1997 USEC became 
a private corporation, and the following year it assumed 
control of enrichment activities (Bechtel Jacobs Company, 
2001).
 There have also been changes in the regulatory agen-
cies that had responsibility over activities at PGDP.  In 
January 1975, functions previously under the control of 
the AEC were transferred to two different agencies: the 
Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA) 
assumed responsibility for uranium enrichment, while 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) assumed 
responsibility for the “regulatory oversight of nuclear 
power plants” (USEC, 2001).  In 1997, the DOE assumed 
control of ERDA responsibilities (USEC, 2001).
 The following descriptions help put into perspec-
tive the quantities of radioactive material processed at 
PGDP:
(e)nough radioactive scrap metal to build a full-
size replica of the battleship Missouri; enough 
low-level radioactive waste to cover more than 
22 football fields a yard deep; enough polluted 
ground water to fill 680,000 residential swim-
ming pools.  If laid end to end, the more than 
37,000 cylinders of spent uranium being stored 
outdoors would span 70 miles.  (Carroll and 
Malone, 2000a)
 In June 1999, a whistleblower, or qui tam, suit was 
filed against Lockheed Martin by three workers at PGDP 
and the Natural Resources Defense Council, an envi-
ronmental group, under the False Claims Act (Warrick, 
1999b).  The suit alleged that Lockheed Martin falsified 
environmental safety reports and caused massive environ-
mental damage by mishandling radioactive and chemical 
materials (Bartleman, 2003).  The False Claims Act al-
lows private citizens to file qui tam lawsuits.  In a qui 
tam suit, whistleblowers collect a percentage of money 
resulting from the lawsuit, while being protected against 
retaliation stemming from the suit (Kohn, 2001).  After 
a qui tam suit is filed, the U.S. government may join the 
plaintiffs and use its resources to pursue the case.  In May 
2003, the Justice Department reported that it would join 
the lawsuit only for the allegations that hazardous wastes 
were mishandled (Malone and Carroll, 2003).
 Based on information from this lawsuit, The 
Washington Post broke the story that workers at PGDP 
had been “exposed to dangerous fission byproducts with-
out their knowledge” (Warrick, 1999a).  In the follow-
ing years allegations and evidence of harm to workers, 
the community, and the environment has continued to 
mount.
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PGDP Harms
 To fully demonstrate the harm arising from activities 
at PGDP we present separately the harm to workers, and 
harm to the public and environment.
Harm to Workers
 In the 1950s and 1960s, workers and management 
at PGDP did not fully understand the hazards of working 
with radiation and certain chemicals (Office of Oversight, 
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000).  From early in 
the plant’s history, management gave the impression that 
employee exposure to dangerous radioactive materials 
was minimal.  This attitude is clearly reflected in manage-
rial decisions that put employees in considerable danger. 
For example, Paducah managers encouraged workers to 
wear personal clothing rather than plant-issued protective 
clothing even though it was thought workers were being 
exposed to dangerous materials (Office of Oversight, 
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000).  Furthermore, 
carelessness and a lack of knowledge led to contamina-
tion throughout the facility, including the plant’s lunch 
room and theater (Office of Oversight, Environment, 
Safety and Health, 2000).  Workers were generally happy 
in the belief that their efforts were protecting the country, 
and in the 1950s some workers even took part in govern-
ment radiation experiments that involved breathing ra-
dioactive gas and drinking uranium (Office of Oversight, 
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000).
 As early as 1953, concern was expressed about vis-
ible radioactive dust at PGDP, and in 1959 Union Carbide, 
which then operated the plant, requested studies by the 
AEC on the potential for health risks (Office of Oversight, 
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000).  Several times 
in the plant’s history, recommendations that workers be 
tested for potentially harmful exposures were ignored. 
For example, a 1960 memo revealed that even though it 
was recommended that 300 PGDP workers be tested for 
exposure to neptunium, management declined to do so out 
of fear the union would then request hazard pay (Office of 
Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 2000).  Also, 
in 1985 a government task force recommended a study 
be done to determine whether plant workers were being 
exposed to uranium ash contaminated with high levels 
of plutonium (Malone, 1999); once again, the study was 
never conducted.
 Because workers were exposed to radioactive and 
other harmful materials, there would be a natural concern 
about long-term health problems.  A comparison of the 
incidence of cancer around PGDP with national rates 
reveals ten leukemia deaths when only one was projected 
(Warrick, 1999d).  Canadian researchers exhumed a for-
mer employee’s body in 1983 and tested the bones for 
uranium.  Although the results were not published at the 
time, The Washington Post reported in 1999 that the tests 
indicated uranium levels up to 133 times higher than nor-
mal (Warrick, 1999c).  A 2001 DOE report acknowledges 
that “(a)s many as 400 Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant 
workers received an annual radiation dose up to 20 times 
the limit now considered safe” (Malone, 2001).  In addi-
tion:
(u)p to 4,000 workers performed duties between 
1952 and 1985 in plant areas where they could 
have received high radiation exposure.  One in 
10 received doses ‘that approached or exceeded’ 
regulatory limits … and many more workers 
went untested because managers did not think it 
necessary.  (Carroll, 2000d)
 The potential for harm to employees has continued 
and there appears to be inadequate supervision to prevent 
employees violating safety guidelines.  Between 1994 
and 1999, Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspectors 
found several problems including workers pounding on a 
uranium-plugged process line with a hammer, smuggling 
beer into the plant, sleeping during the handling of liquid 
uranium hexafluoride, and performing jobs without being 
properly trained (Carroll, 1999a).
Harm to the Public and Environment
 Reports indicate the public was not properly informed 
about potential hazards associated with PGDP (Office 
of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 1999; 
Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 
2000).  For example, liquid waste that included uranium 
and fission products was released “into ditches, ponds, 
and streams, with subsequent flow into the Big and Little 
Bayou creeks, ultimately reaching the Ohio river” (Office 
of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 2000:20). 
Although plant officials were aware of such problems, 
they did not always act on such information, as illustrated 
by a 1977 internal plant memo that acknowledged urani-
um discharges were being “significantly underestimated” 
(Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 
2000).  Because of such acts, wells around the plant be-
came contaminated, leading the government to provide 
free municipal water to some residents and businesses 
(Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 
1999).  Contaminated materials also were improperly 
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removed from PGDP property.  The Office of Oversight 
report (Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety and 
Health, 2000) found that material released to the pub-
lic—for example, old equipment that was sold—was not 
always properly screened for contamination.  In addition, 
waste materials, such as scrap wood and metals, were not 
adequately controlled as members of the public would 
salvage these from PGDP property.
 Evidence of potential harm to the community and en-
vironment has continued to emerge.  In 1999, one lawsuit 
plaintiff described recent problems at the plant: a com-
puter from the plant that was supposed to be donated to 
a school was discovered to be contaminated by radiation; 
some members of a work team on a radioactive site failed 
their training because, it turned out, they were function-
ally illiterate and could not read posted hazard signs; 
cleanup teams were sent into a contaminated building 
without protective breathing equipment; and no monitor-
ing devices existed in places like cafeterias to ensure that 
workers who may have been exposed to radiation do not 
bring contamination with them (Carroll, 1999b).
 Another recent problem included the 1999 discov-
ery of “radioactive black ooze” seeping from ground 
near PGDP (Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety 
and Health, 1999).  A year later, beryllium, a suspected 
carcinogen, was discovered in soil, surface water, and 
ground water samples beneath the plant; one soil sample 
had 155 times the natural level (Malone, 2000b).  More 
effects of practices at PGDP were revealed in a study that 
found “(m)ore than half of 44 raccoons examined had 
above-normal radiation emissions…The findings are sig-
nificant because raccoons eat almost anything, so if there 
is contamination low in the food chain, it would show up 
in them” (Carroll, 2000e).  DOE maps released in 2000 
showed that:
11 contaminants have spread extensively into 
the recreation and wildlife areas surround-
ing the plant…Amounts of highly radioactive 
neptunium were 509 times as high as what is 
normally found in the environment, and radioac-
tive cesium was found at levels up to 326 times 
normal. (Malone, 2000d)
 Even with reports such as these, the true extent of 
problems at PGDP will never be known.  It is estimated 
that 27.4 percent of records about safety concerns were 
destroyed before USEC took control of the plant in 1993 
(Carroll and Malone, 2000b).  These records are thought 
to have included evidence of a lax attitude toward safety 
by first-line supervisors, inconsistent investigations of 
accidents, purposeful violations of health and safety 
rules by management and rank-and-file workers, and use 
of old data and questionable analyses to assess environ-
mental contamination (Carroll and Malone, 2000b).  This 
evidence suggests steps were taken to conceal evidence 
relating to plant safety; the DOE has concluded that the 
destruction of these computer and paper records was “in-
appropriate” (Carroll and Malone, 2000b).
 Despite the evident harms and rule violations, be-
tween the mid-1980s and 2000, the state of Kentucky 
fined the DOE only $5,000.  “Kentucky officials say they 
(were) hampered over the years by government secrecy, a 
lack of resources and, until 1992, questions about whether 
they could legally challenge the Energy Department” 
(Malone and Carroll, 2000).  Government secrecy about 
nuclear activity is nothing new, and the present findings 
are consistent with previous discoveries (Kauzlarich and 
Kramer, 1998).
An Apology, Compensation, and Clean-Up
 In 1980, after PGDP employee Joe Harding died 
of cancer, the U.S. government refused to pay his wife 
survivor benefits, claiming his illness was not related 
to radiation exposure, and spent $1.5 million fighting 
the claim (Shipley, 2001).  Harding’s wife eventually 
settled for $12,000 (Warrick, 1999c), but continued to 
fight the case along with others who alleged harm.  These 
efforts contributed to passage of the $1.9 billion Energy 
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Act, 
which provides medical and financial help for workers 
and their families at a number of nuclear facilities where 
dangerous work was conducted.  The compensation plan 
has a limit of $150,000 per claim and does not cover lost 
wages due to “illness or injury from exposure to radiation 
and hazardous chemicals” (Carroll, 2000b).
 On May 31, 1994, the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion 
Plant was identified for priority cleanup and added to the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Superfund national 
priorities list. The DOE has established a clean-up sched-
ule to be completed by 2010.  More than $1.3 billion has 
been allocated to deal with pollution in groundwater, 
surface water, surface soils, burial grounds, waste barrels, 
and unused process buildings, and to monitor the site and 
issue clean-up reports (Jones, 2000).
 On Sept. 16, 1999, the federal government took the 
unusual step of issuing a formal apology for concealing 
information that caused PGDP workers to be placed in 
danger.  Then-Energy Secretary Bill Richardson visited 
Paducah and at a community meeting stated:
Bruce & Becker / Western Criminology Review 8(2), 29–43 (2007)
35
On behalf of the U.S. government, I am here 
to say I am sorry … We are apologizing to the 
workers in Paducah. From the evidence that has 
been uncovered recently, it’s obvious that the 
U.S. government was not forthcoming about 
possible exposure to plutonium, and that was 
wrong. We should have been straight with our 
employees.  (Malone and Carroll, 1999)
 While the DOE has estimated it will cost $1.3 billion 
to clean up PGDP (Jones, 2000), other estimates suggest 
the cost will be as high as $5 billion (Malone, 2000c). 
There is also concern that even if the cleanup is com-
pleted by the 2010 deadline that will not mean the plant 
is “clean” in the way most people understand the term. 
Court action continues between federal and state authori-
ties over what “clean” actually means (Carroll, 2000a). 
While cleanup operations are now underway there is con-
cern that they may not be properly conducted; regulators 
have already cited the DOE for violating state-air quality 
regulations while clearing “Drum Mountain” (Gil, 2000). 
Drum Mountain is a 40 foot tall pile of discarded radioac-
tive metal drums (Malone, 2000c).
Integrated Theoretical Framework
 To fully understand state-corporate crime, Kauzlarich 
and Kramer (1998) propose an integrated theoretical 
framework that considers the impact of specific “catalysts 
for action” at three levels of analysis. Traditional crimi-
nological theories typically focus on relations between 
individual actors and exclude consideration of organi-
zational or social structural factors on behavior.  While 
Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) recognize the importance 
of the interactional level of analysis (face-to-face in-
teraction, individual action) they also recognize this is 
insufficient for more fully understanding organizational 
behavior.  It would be easy to blame the actions of indi-
vidual employees for the harms at PGDP but such an ap-
proach is insufficient for understanding these harms as it 
overlooks the vital role of organizational and institutional 
factors.  Organizational structure, goals, and culture are 
important determinants of both organizational and indi-
vidual behavior; thus, an organizational level of analysis 
(structure and process) is also necessary to understand 
state-corporate crime.  Finally, both organizational and 
individual behaviors are influenced by the broader social 
context, so an institutional level of analysis (historical, 
political, economical, and cultural factors) is necessary to 
complete the analysis of state-corporate crime.  At each 
level of analysis, Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) identify 
the interaction of three “catalysts for action”: motivation, 
opportunity structure, and social control.  Kauzlarich and 
Kramer’s (1998) integrated model helps illustrate how 
institutional, organizational, and individual actors con-
tributed to the events at PGDP.
Institutional Level of Analysis
 Motivation.  At the institutional level of analysis, 
the Cold War climate encouraged use and development of 
nuclear technology, created public support for the nuclear 
industry, and created a sense of urgency in the develop-
ment of nuclear technology.  In such an atmosphere, the 
perceived greater national good was given precedence 
over health hazards to employees or environmental 
damage.  The perceived threat of nuclear weapons in the 
Soviet Union meant that organizational goals were to be 
quickly achieved, even at the expense of individuals and 
the environment.  This likely contributed to acceptance of 
some “rule bending” in pursuit of apparently legitimate 
goals.  A 2000 DOE report points out that during the Cold 
War, health, safety, and environmental concerns were 
less important than the pressing demands of the Cold War 
(Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 
2000).
 A number of governmental goals provided the mo-
tivation for rapid development of the nuclear industry, 
and these goals could not have been achieved without 
the involvement of private corporations.  Duffy (1997) 
describes the following governmental goals that moti-
vated the rapid development of nuclear technology and 
the involvement of private corporations: energy needs, 
controlling nuclear proliferation, deterring the Soviets, 
and remaining the leader in nuclear development.
 Opportunity structure.  Although the government 
drove development of the nuclear industry, it would not 
have flourished without the involvement of private cor-
porations.  The opportunity for private corporate involve-
ment was created by passage of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954.  Previously the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 had 
“expressly forbidden private ownership of nuclear ma-
terials and had established an absolute government mo-
nopoly over nuclear energy” (Ford, 1982:41).  The 1954 
act reveals changing attitudes toward nuclear energy, as 
it allowed “private companies to build and operate com-
mercial nuclear-power stations” (Ford, 1982:41).  Private 
corporations had been reluctant to call for changes in 
legislation to allow their involvement in the nuclear in-
dustry because of its financial uncertainties; the cost of 
establishing nuclear production facilities, combined with 
its potential for risk, scared corporations away from this 
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technology.  The federal government encouraged private 
corporations to get involved and offered them economic 
incentives to do so.  Duffy (1997:34) states:
The “solution” to the government’s “problems” 
was the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which, in 
effect, created both commercial nuclear power 
and a commercial nuclear power industry.  In 
this sense, the development of commercial 
nuclear power is unusual in that it emerged from 
an effort initiated by government rather than by 
private industry.
 This is an important point for our argument that 
harms at PGDP are initially an example of state-initi-
ated state-corporate crime; from the beginning it was the 
federal government that initiated involvement of private 
corporations in the development of this field.
 Government efforts to promote a peaceful image of 
nuclear power contributed to the opportunity to develop 
nuclear technology.  These efforts included downplaying 
the danger of nuclear technology and the need for safety 
precautions, while emphasizing its advantages.  In a 
1953 address to the United Nations General Assembly, 
President Eisenhower presented his vision of “atoms for 
peace.”  “The United States knows that peaceful power 
from atomic energy is no dream of the future.  That ca-
pability, already proved, is here-now, today,” Eisenhower 
said.  He went on to say that nuclear energy could be 
used to “provide abundant electrical energy in the power-
starved areas of the world” (Ford, 1982:40).  In 1954, 
construction of the nation’s first commercial nuclear 
power plant was presented to the public in dramatic fash-
ion when Eisenhower appeared on television and, with 
a wave of his hand, “signaled an unmanned, radio-con-
trolled bulldozer to begin breaking ground” for the plant 
(Stoler, 1985:16).
 The events at PGDP can be classified as state-initi-
ated state-corporate crime; they could not have occurred 
without government efforts.  Government created the 
opportunity for development of the nuclear industry by 
initiating the involvement of private corporations, and 
waging a campaign that emphasized the nuclear threat to 
the United States while changing perceptions of nuclear 
technology as purely destructive.
 Social control.  At the institutional level, there has 
historically been little social control over the nuclear 
industry (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998).  Secrecy has 
dominated the industry, and government’s ability to single 
out and replace people who violate its rules has helped 
divert criticism.  Nuclear technology was developed in 
an atmosphere of irresponsibility that minimized safety 
concerns.  According to former AEC attorney Harold 
Green “nobody really ever thought safety was a problem. 
They assumed that if you just wrote the requirement that 
it be done properly, it would be done properly” (Ford, 
1982:42).  This laissez-faire approach to safety enforce-
ment contributed to the absence of social control through-
out the nuclear industry.
 The comments of Edward Teller, head of the AEC’s 
Reactor Safeguards Committee, illustrate how advancing 
nuclear development was considered more important 
than safety concerns.  In a 1953 discussion on whether 
to continue the practice of creating “exclusion distances” 
around nuclear reactors to keep the public at safe dis-
tance, Teller warned that enforcement of safety regula-
tions “must not stand in the way of rapid development of 
nuclear power” (Ford, 1982:43).  These comments reveal 
that despite awareness of dangers involved in developing 
nuclear technology, government was prepared to loosen 
its control over the nuclear industry to achieve its goals. 
A lax attitude at the institutional level creates an overall 
climate that reduces the likelihood rigorous control ef-
forts will be a priority in the nuclear industry.
 In the case of PGDP, social control was inadequate 
at the institutional level as regulatory agencies were often 
lax in their investigation of the facility.  State officials 
in Kentucky were unclear as to the control they could 
exercise over activities at PGDP; therefore, financial 
penalties for safety violations were insufficient to deter 
risky practices most efficient for achieving organizational 
goals (Gil, 2000).
Organizational Level of Analysis
 At the organizational level of analysis, there is con-
siderable evidence that organizational goals encouraged 
lax security practices and poor decisions regarding em-
ployee and environmental safety.  While safety concerns 
surfaced periodically, the general practice at PGDP was 
to downplay these concerns and continue with the most 
economical approach.  Indeed, it is possible that some re-
ductions in security measures were meant to demonstrate 
to employees the degree of organizational confidence in 
safety at PGDP.
 Motivation.  Evidence reveals that despite know-
ing the health risks to employees, plant managers were 
motivated to pursue production goals at the expense of 
employee safety and failed to effectively communicate 
safety concerns to employees.  The Department of 
Energy’s Office of Oversight reported that during the 
1950’s:
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(N)ot all workers had a clear understanding 
of the need to wear anti-contamination cloth-
ing. Contributing to this situation was the 
discretionary application of Carbide’s policy 
on anti-contamination clothing and a non-con-
servative approach to the provision of company 
clothes…Carbide management sought ways to 
acquaint newly acquired personnel with known 
hazards without impacting production.  (Office 
of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 
2000:38)
 Opportunity structure.  Plant administrators 
habitually ignored safety warnings and, when faced 
with alternatives, repeatedly chose hazardous means 
as the most efficient way to meet organizational goals. 
These practices increased the opportunity for employee 
exposure to hazardous conditions.  From the beginning 
at PGDP, health and safety programs were in place, but 
were inadequate:
The Health Physics Section from the commence-
ment of operations until 1990 ranged in size from 
as few as two to six employees.  The Industrial 
Hygiene Section typically consisted of one or 
two industrial hygienists and a technician…in 
the early decades, health and safety profession-
als had limited authority and resources to ensure 
that line management would implement recom-
mended hazard controls.  (Office of Oversight, 
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000:36)
 While training sessions were held to inform employ-
ees of hazards, the Office of Oversight (2000) team noted 
that from the 1950s to the 1960s the number of hours 
devoted to hazard communication declined by as much as 
50 percent.  Thus, as knowledge of the dangers of work-
ing with nuclear materials increased, PGDP management 
decreased the amount of safety training for employees, 
therefore increasing the opportunity for employee harm. 
Over time safety program training was replaced with on-
the-job training as the principal means to keep workers 
informed of hazards at the plant (Office of Oversight, 
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000).  Investigators 
concluded that by the 1980s employees were given 
less training than during the 1950s, despite the greater 
knowledge of danger.  Investigators further stated that al-
though there were written materials to educate employees 
about plant hazards “(t)here is no evidence of the extent 
to which this information was either made available or 
required reading, nor is there any indication of supervi-
sors’ diligence in ensuring that Plant health and safety 
hazards were being communicated to workers” (Office of 
Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 2000:39).
 Although contamination control was known to be im-
portant for employee safety, such practices were neither 
mandatory nor rigorously enforced until the mid-1980s. 
At times, management provided workers with incorrect 
information on contamination control, such as telling 
that uranium compounds were safe enough to eat (Office 
of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 2000). 
Recommendations for safety and contamination control 
were sometimes ignored; for example, although it was 
recommended that employees wear respiratory protec-
tion devices, line managers did not always direct work-
ers to follow the recommendation (Office of Oversight, 
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000).  In some cases, 
management discouraged the use of protective clothing, 
and in one part of the plant (the C-720 Control Valve Shop) 
“evidence suggests that Paducah personnel routinely 
exceeded personal clothing contamination limits without 
corrective actions being taken by management” (Office 
of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 2000:45). 
These organizational practices created the opportunity for 
individual employees to violate safety requirements and 
place themselves at considerable risk.
 Social control.  Social control was generally lack-
ing as plant management failed to adequately implement 
safety training and enforce employee compliance with 
safety recommendations.  The Office of Oversight inves-
tigators concluded that:
(i)mplementation of the radiological protection 
program at PGDP was very inconsistent between 
1952 and 1989.  Limited health physics staffing, 
a failure to communicate exposure levels and 
transuranic hazards to workers, worker failure 
to follow radiological control measures, a fail-
ure to consistently enforce radiological control 
measures, and a lack of adequate understanding 
and appreciation of the hazards of uranium and 
transuranics all contributed to inconsistent imple-
mentation.  (Office of Oversight, Environment, 
Safety and Health, 2000:78)
 Plant management created a climate in which workers 
trusted that what they were doing was safe, and by down-
playing the need to wear protective clothing, contributed 
to an environment that did little to encourage the use of 
precautions.  Secrecy made this climate easy for manage-
ment to perpetuate due to the “need to know basis” of 
information about plant activities, and employee trust of 
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their employer (Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety 
and Health, 2000).
Interactional Level of Analysis
 Motivation.  At the interactional level, there was 
considerable motivation for PGDP employees to perform 
their assigned tasks.  Employees had considerable finan-
cial motivation because they lived in an economically-de-
pressed area before the opening of the gaseous diffusion 
plant.  They were also socialized in an environment that 
assured the technology was safe and adequate protections 
were in place.  Workers had additional motivation in the 
belief they were performing important tasks that contrib-
uted to national security.
 Opportunity structure.  At the individual level, 
there was considerable opportunity to engage in hazard-
ous activity.  It is apparent that workers were socialized 
into an environment in which illegal activities became the 
norm and were defined as acceptable methods for “getting 
the job done.”  The absence of close supervision meant 
employees were given many opportunities to engage in 
hazardous activity.
 Social control.  From the beginning, PGDP employ-
ees had much to lose by refusing to follow organizational 
instructions; thus, it is not surprising that they engaged 
in questionable practices over an extended period.  The 
economic climate meant employees could not afford to 
lose their sources of income.  Individual workers em-
ployed a number of techniques of neutralization (Sykes 
and Matza, 1957) in performing their duties, including 
appeal to higher loyalties in the belief that their work was 
a patriotic duty benefiting the entire country.  There was 
also no adequate system to control employee behavior 
and enforce safety guidelines.  Employees were ill-in-
formed of risks and left to make their own decisions about 
the need to take safety precautions.  For these reasons, 
workers were denied the opportunity to make informed 
decisions concerning performance of duties and safety 
precautions.
Conclusion
 Our examination of harms at PGDP leads us to con-
clude that as government behavior changes these harms 
constitute instances of both state-initiated and state-
facilitated state-corporate crime.  The U.S. government 
made the decision to locate a nuclear plant at the Paducah 
site and subsequently encouraged a generally lax attitude 
towards safety, and harmed plant workers by deliber-
ately exposing them to materials known to be harmful. 
Government also placed plant development ahead of en-
vironmental safety despite evidence of the inevitability of 
environmental harm.  We find Kauzlarich and Kramer’s 
(1998) integrated theoretical framework to be very useful 
in clarifying the complex relationship between catalysts 
for action at different levels of analysis, and helps clarify 
the roles of the state, private corporations, and individual 
plant workers in the harms at PGDP.  Analysis of events 
and harms at PGDP reveals change in state contribution 
to state-corporate crime.  Specifically, utilizing the “com-
plicity continuum” of state-corporate crime proposed by 
Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews (2003) we find the 
state role evolves from that of instigator to facilitator of 
state-corporate crime at PGDP.  Over the life of the plant 
the state takes deliberate steps to transfer plant ownership 
and operation to private corporations and transforms its 
role to that of regulator; given the abysmal record of gov-
ernmental efforts to enforce safety regulations at PGDP 
we believe its role clearly changes from that of instigator 
to facilitator of state-corporate crime.
 Kauzlarich et al. (2003) further the study of state-
corporate crime by locating it within a “complicity con-
tinuum.”  That is, these authors distinguish types of state 
crime by highlighting state behavior.  They emphasize 
that state crime arises from both state action (commis-
sion) and inaction (omission), and identify four distinct 
categories of state crime.  Explicit acts of commission 
are the most extreme acts of deliberate state action to-
wards clearly-specified goals, and are exemplified by the 
Holocaust (Kauzlarich et al. 2003: 248).  Implicit acts of 
commission occur when “state agencies tacitly support 
actions which result in social injury, but their connection 
is more distant than proximal” (2003:248).  Kauzlarich 
et al. identify state-initiated state-corporate crimes as 
examples of implicit acts of commission.  Explicit acts 
of omission “occur when the sate disregards unsafe 
and dangerous conditions, when it has a clear mandate 
and responsibility to make a situation or context safe” 
(2003:249).  We believe state-facilitated corporate crime 
falls into this category.  Finally, implicit acts of omission 
refer to more general harmful social conditions the state 
has the power to eliminate or reduce, such as economic 
inequality.  Kauzlarich et al. note that by “doing nothing 
– or next to nothing – to ameliorate such problems, the 
state is engaged in crime because it is allowing institu-
tions and actions to remain inadequate, harmful, and mar-
ginalizing” (2003:250).
 Government efforts to change its role in nuclear 
plant involvement is clear from the passage of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 that allowed private corporate in-
volvement in the nuclear industry; ultimately at PGDP 
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this role change resulted in transfer of plant ownership 
and operation to various private corporations, with the 
state taking on responsibility for safety regulation.  It is 
clear that dangers associated with the nuclear industry 
were known, and that through the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 the US government initiated participation of private 
corporations.  Given the government’s role in encourag-
ing corporations to participate in a dangerous business, 
it was government’s responsibility to implement and 
enforce strict regulations to ensure safety of nuclear 
plant employees and the public, however, government 
efforts were entirely inadequate and sanctions were 
rarely enforced for violations of safety standards.  At the 
organizational level, while safety guidelines were devel-
oped, safety programs were inappropriately staffed, and 
it was generally left to line personnel to make sure that 
safety measures were being followed.  Given the climate 
created by government and management, and the failure 
of government to regulate and enforce safety standards 
PGDP employees were unlikely to fully appreciate the 
dangers of their work and thus unlikely to take adequate 
precautions.
 The Louisville Courier-Journal provides a good 
summary of the harms caused to PGDP workers as well 
as the community and surrounding area:
Sloppy safety practices, concealed health con-
cerns, and decades of ignorance, expediency 
and poor oversight have left workers, nearby 
wildlife and the land itself damaged by chemical 
and radioactive toxins.  Workers have inhaled 
the radioactive dust, chemicals have seeped into 
the ground water, and debris dumped off the site 
has created pockets of radiation.  And the silent 
devastation is being seen in creatures ranging 
from insects to bobcats—an ominous warning 
to the humans who share the same soil, water, 
and air.  (Carroll and Malone, 2000a)
 In this case, as acknowledged by the federal gov-
ernment (Carroll, 2000c), a series of decisions from the 
governmental level to the plant operators ensured PGDP 
workers, the environment, and public safety were victims 
of state-corporate crime.  Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998) 
theoretical framework helps clarify how such harms come 
about, while Kauzlarich et al.’s (2003) “complicity con-
tinuum” highlights how the state role in state-corporate 
crime can change over time.
Endnotes
 1. Since we are focused on how useful Kauzlarich 
and Kramer’s (1998) integrated theoretical model of 
state-corporate crime is for understanding harm at PGDP 
we rely heavily on their work in defining the concept and 
framing issues discussed in the paper.
References
Aulette, Judy R. and Raymond Michalowski.  1993.  “Fire 
in Hamlet: A Case Study of State-Corporate Crime.” 
Pp. 160-190 in White-Collar Crime: Classic and 
Contemporary Views, edited by G. Geis, R. F. Meier, 
and L. M. Salinger. New York, NY:  The Free Press.
Baker, Peter and Steven Mufson.  2006.  “ Bush 
Calls for New Nuclear Plants; President Talks of 
Environmental Benefits, Safety.”  The Washington 
Post, May 25.  Retrieved June 19, 2006 (quvpn.
quinnipiac.edu/http/0/web.lexisnexis.com/universe/
document?_m=f4b8e6b1f9eb07f386f1209253e99bc
f&_docnum=55&wchp=dGLbVzbzSkVA&_md5=8
1b508a50ef1e0fe9169fcd131cbba26).
Bartleman, Bill.  2003.  “DOE Suit’s 15th Delay Sparking 
Questions.”  The Paducah Sun, January 30.  Retrieved 
January 31, 2003 (http://www.paducahsun.com).
Bechtel Jacobs Company.  2001.  Recycled Uranium 
Mass Balance Project: Paducah Gaseous Diffusion 
Plant site report.  Bechtel Jacobs Company.
Becker, Paul J., Art Jipson, and Alan S. Bruce.  2000.  “The 
Pinto Legacy: The Community as an Indirect Victim 
of Corporate Deviance.”  The Justice Professional 
12:305-326.
Berg, Bruce L.  2001.  Qualitative Research Methods for 
the Social Sciences.  Needham Heights, MA: Allyn 
and Bacon.
Bullard, Robert D.  1993.  Confronting Environmental 
Racism: Voices from the Grassroots.  Boston, MA: 
South End Press.
Bullard, Robert D.  2000.  Dumping in Dixie: Race, 
Class, and Environmental Quality.  Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press.
State-Corporate Crime and the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
40
Carroll, James R. 1999a.  “NRC Found Safety Lapses 
at Paducah for 5 Years.”  The (Louisville) Courier-
Journal, October 26.  Retrieved October 27, (www.
courierjournal.com/localnews/1999/9910/26/
991026uran.html).
Carroll, James R. (1999b). “Witness: Safety Lax at 
Paducah.”  The (Louisville) Courier-Journal, 
September 23.  Retrieved September 24, 1999 
(www.courierjournal.com/localnews/1999/9909/23/ 
9909233uran.html).
Carroll, James R.  2000a. “Cleanup; Elusive, Terribly 
Expensive; Current Plan Excludes Some Enormous 
Tasks.”  The (Louisville) Courier-Journal, June 26. 
Retrieved November 1, 2000 (www.courier-journal.
com/cjextra/uranium/).
Carroll, James R.  2000b. “Compromise Reached on 
Aid for Ill Nuclear Workers: New Proposal is Less 
Generous than Plan Approved Earlier by Senate.” 
The (Louisville) Courier-Journal, June 26.  The 
(Louisville) Courier-Journal, June 26.  Retrieved 
November 1, 2000 (www.courier-journal.com/
cjextra/uranium/).
Carroll, James R.  2000c. “Congress OK’s Money for 
Paducah Plant.”  The (Louisville) Courier-Journal, 
October 6.  Retrieved November 1, 2000 (www.
courier-journal.com/cjextra/uranium/).
Carroll, James R.  2000d. “Ex-uranium Workers Had Host 
of Ills; Lung Diseases Widespread, Some Cancers 
Reported.”  The (Louisville) Courier-Journal, 
October 20.  Retrieved November 1, 2000 (www.
courier-journal.com/cjextra/uranium/).
Carroll, James R.  2000e. “Raccoons Show Scientists 
Contaminants are Accumulating.”  The (Louisville) 
Courier-Journal, March 23.  Retrieved November 1, 
2000 (www.courier-journal.com/cjextra/uranium/).
Carroll, James R. and James Malone.  2000a. “Decades 
of Deception: Uranium’s Broken Promise.”  The 
(Louisville) Courier-Journal, June 25.  Retrieved 
November 1, 2000 (www.courier-journal.com/
cjextra/uranium/).
Carroll, James R. and James Malone. 2000b. “Safety 
Data Erased at Uranium Plants; Records Show 
U.S. Didn’t Clear Firms’ Actions.”  The (Louisville) 
Courier-Journal, April 30.  Retrieved November 1, 
2000 (www.courier-journal.com/cjextra/uranium/).
Clinard, Marshall B. and Peter C. Yeager.  1980. 
Corporate Crime.  New York, NY: The Free Press.
Coleman, James W.  1985.  The Criminal Elite: The 
Sociology of White Collar Crime. New York, NY: St. 
Martin’s Press.
Coleman, James S.  2002.  “Organization Actors and the 
Irrelevance of Persons.”  Pp. 95–104 in Corporate 
and Governmental Deviance: Problems of 
Organizational Behavior in Contemporary Society, 
edited by M. D. Ermann and R. J. Lundman.  New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Duffy, Robert J.  1997.  Nuclear Politics in America: 
A History and Theory of Government Regulation. 
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
Eisler, Peter.  2000.  “Poisoned Workers and Poisoned 
Places: Special Report” USA Today, September 6-8, 
2000. Retrieved July 1, 2001 (www.usatoday.com/
news/poison/cover.htm).
Ford, Daniel.  1982.  The Cult of the Atom: The Secret 
Papers of the Atomic Energy Commission.  New 
York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
Geis, Gilbert.  2005.  “Corporate Criminal Liability. 
Pp. 211–213 in Encyclopedia of White-Collar 
and Corporate Crime, edited by L. M. Salinger. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Gil, Gideon.  2000.  “U.S. Violated Pollution Laws at 
Paducah; Kentucky Cited DOE Over Cleanup 
at Uranium Plant.”  The (Louisville) Courier-
Journal, July 28.  Retrieved July 29, 2000 (www.
courier-journal.com/localnews/2000/0007/28/ 
00728uranium.html).
Hall, Richard H.  1987.  “Organizational Behavior: A 
Sociological Perspective. Pp. 84–95 in Handbook 
of Organizational Behavior, edited by J. W. Lorsch. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Bruce & Becker / Western Criminology Review 8(2), 29–43 (2007)
41
Johnson, John M. and Jack D. Douglas, eds.  1978. 
Crime and the Top: Deviance in Business and 
the Professions.  New York, NY: J.B. Lippincott 
Company.
Jones, Gary L.  2000.  “Nuclear Waste Cleanup: DOE’s 
Cleanup Plan for the Paducah, Kentucky Site Faces 
Uncertainties and Excludes Costly Activities.” 
Subcommittee on Energy Research, Development, 
Production, and Regulation, Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources. Washington DC: United 
States General Accounting Office.
Kauzlarich, David.  1995. “A Criminology of the Nuclear 
State.”  Humanity and Society 19:37–57.
Kauzlarich, David and Ronald C. Kramer.  1993. 
“State-Corporate Crime in the US Nuclear Weapons 
Production Complex.”  The Journal of Human 
Justice 5:4–28.
Kauzlarich, David and Ronald C. Kramer.  1998.  Crimes 
of the American Nuclear State: At Home and Abroad. 
Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
Kauzlarich, David, Christopher Mullins and Rick A. 
Matthews. 2003. “A Complicity Continuum of State 
Crime.” Contemporary Justice Review 6:241–254.
Kohn, Stephen M. 2001.  Concepts and Procedures in 
Whistleblower Law.  Westport, CT: Quorum Books.
Kramer, Ronald C.  1992.  “The Space Shuttle Challenger 
Explosion: A Case Study of State-Corporate Crime.” 
Pp. 214–243 in White-Collar Crime Reconsidered, 
edited by K. Schlegel and D. Weisburd.  Boston, 
MA: Northeastern University Press.
Kramer, Ronald C., Raymond J. Michalowski and David 
Kauzlarich.  2002.  “The Origins and Development of 
the Concept and Theory of State-Corporate Crime.” 
Crime and Delinquency 48:263–282.
Malone, James.  1999. “’85 Report Urged Uranium 
Worker Tests.”  The (Louisville) Courier-Journal, 
September 18.  Retrieved September 19, 1999 
(www.courer-journal.com/localnews/1999/9909/18/ 
990918ash.html).
Malone, James. 2000a. “’Almost Overnight, Paducah 
Became the Promised Land’ Little Thought Given to 
Health, the Environment.”  The (Louisville) Courier-
Journal, June 25.  Retrieved November 1, 2000 
(www.courier-journal.com/cjextra/uranium/).
Malone, James.  2000b. “Deadly Metal Taints Paducah 
Plant.”  The (Louisville) Courier-Journal, February 
23.  Retrieved November 1, 2000 (www.courier-
journal.com/cjextra/uranium/).
Malone, James.  2000c. “Former Worker Now Believes 
Paycheck Came with a Price: Information and 
Protection Were Scarce, He Says.”  The (Louisville) 
Courier-Journal, June 25.  Retrieved November 1, 
2000 (www.courier-journal.com/cjextra/uranium/).
Malone, James.  2000d. “Paducah Toxins Widespread: 
Maps Show Contamination Area Outside Uranium-
Processing Site.”  The (Louisville) Courier-Journal, 
October 6.  Retrieved October 6, 2004 (www.
courier-journal.com/localnews/2000/0010/06/
001006paducah.html).
Malone, James. 2001.  “Plant’s Radiation Dwarfed 
Limits: Up to 400 Paducah Workers Got Doses 20 
Times Current Cutoff.”  The (Louisville) Courier-
Journal, January 11.  Retrieved November 1, 2001 
(www.courier-journal.com/cjextra/uranium/).
Malone, James and James R. Carroll.  1999.  “Uranium 
Workers Get Apology; Energy Chief: Government 
Failed Them.”  The (Louisville) Courier-Journal, 
September 17.  Retrieved November 1, 2000 (www.
courier-journal.com/cjextra/uranium/).
Malone, James and James R. Carroll. 2000.  “Cold War 
Poison: The Paducah Legacy; Kentucky Has Gone 
Easy on Uranium Plant.”  The (Louisville) Courier-
Journal, June 27.  Retrieved November 1, 2000 
(www.courier-journal.com/cjextra/uranium/).
Malone, James and James R. Carroll.  2003.  “U.S. Will 
Join Suit Against Paducah Plant’s Former Operator.” 
The (Louisville) Courier-Journal. May 31. Retrieved 
May 31, 2003   (www.courier-journal.com/ localnews/
2003/05/31ky/wir-front-whistle0531-6839.html).
Matthews, Rick A. and David Kauzlarich.  2000.  “The 
Crash of ValuJet Flight 592: A Case Study in State-
Corporate Crime.”  Sociological Focus 3:281-296.
State-Corporate Crime and the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
42
Nelson, Daniel.  1975.  Managers and Workers: Origins 
of the New Factory System in the United States 
1880–1920.  Madison, WI: The University of 
Wisconsin Press.
Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health. 
1999.  Phase I Independent Investigation of the 
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Environment, 
Safety, and Health Issues.  Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Energy, Office of Oversight.
Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health. 
2000.  Phase II Independent Investigation of the 
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.  Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Oversight.
Pellow, David N.  2002.  Garbage Wars: the Struggle for 
Environmental Justice in Chicago.  Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.
Perrow, Charles.  1984.  Normal Accidents: Living with 
High-Risk Technologies.  New York, NY: Basic 
Books.
Platt, Jennifer.  1981.  “Evidence and Proof in Documen-
tary Research:  Some Specific Problems of Docu-
mentary Research.”  Sociological Review 29:31–52.
Reiman, Jeffrey.  2001.  The Rich Get Richer And The 
Poor Get Prison: Ideology, Class, and Criminal 
Justice.  Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Shipley, Sara.  2001.  “Uranium Settlement.”  The 
(Louisville) Courier-Journal, August 10, pp. 1, 5.
Stake, Robert E.  2000.  “Case Studies.”  Pp. 435-454 
in Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd ed. edited 
by N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln.  Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage.
Stoler, Peter.  1985.  Decline and Fail: The Ailing Nuclear 
Power Industry.  New York, NY: Dodd, Mead and 
Company.
Stone, Christopher D.  1978.  “Corporations and Law: 
Ending the Impasse.”  Pp. 329–332 in Crime and the 
Top: Deviance in Business and the Professions, edited 
by J. M. Johnson and J. D. Douglas.  Philadelphia, 
PA: J. B. Lippincott Company.
Sykes, Gresham M. and David Matza.  1957.  “Techniques 
of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency.” 
American Sociological Review 22:664–670.
USEC.  2001.  Plant History.  The United States 
Enrichment Corporation Homepage. Retrieved 
January 3, 2002 (www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/
Facilities_PaducahHistory.asp).
Vaughan, Diane.  1983.  Controlling Unlawful 
Organizational Behavior: Social Structure and 
Corporate Misconduct.  Chicago, IL: The University 
of Chicago Press.
Warrick, Joby.  1999a. “In Harm’s Way, And in the Dark; 
Workers Exposed to Plutonium at U.S. Plant.”  The 
Washington Post, August 7.  Retrieved August 8, 
1999 (washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/nation/specials/
aroundthenation/paducah/ A36961-1999Aug7.html).
Warrick, Joby.  1999b. “Paducah Workers Sue Firms; 
Class Action Cites Radiation Exposure, Seeks 
$10 Billion.”  The Washington Post, September 3. 
Retrieved September 3, 1999 (washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/nation/specials/aroundthenation/ paducah/
A16812-1999Sept3.html).
Warrick, Joby. 1999c. “Paducah’s Silent Witness; 
Excessive Uranium Level Found in Worker’s 
Bones.”  The Washington Post, August 22.  Retrieved 
August 22, 1999 (www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A27825-1999Aug22.html).
Warrick, Joby. 1999d. “Plant Hid Risk from Workers; 
Paducah Bosses Knew Some Had High Radiation 
Levels.”  The Washington Post, December 22. 
Retrieved December  22, 1999 (washingtonpost.com/
wpdyn/nation/specials/aroundthenation/paducah/ 
A25960-1999Dec22.html).
Weber, Max.  1947.  The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization.  Translated by A. M. Henderson and 
Talcott Parsons.  New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press.
Yin, Robert K.  1994.  Case Study Research.  2nd ed. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Bruce & Becker / Western Criminology Review 8(2), 29–43 (2007)
43
About the authors:
Alan S. Bruce received his Ph.D. from Bowling Green State University in 1998 and is an Associate Professor of 
Sociology at Quinnipiac University in Hamden, Connecticut.  His wide range of teaching and research interests 
include state and corporate crime, juvenile justice, criminal justice policy creation, and theories of crime.  His work 
has been published in journals and books including Teaching Sociology, The Journal of Criminal Justice Education, 
and Key Correctional Issues, edited by Roslyn Muraskin.
Dr. Paul Becker is an associate professor of sociology in the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social 
Work at the University of Dayton, where he also is affiliated with the Criminal Justice Studies Program.  His research 
interests include white racial extremist groups, hate crimes, corporate crime, and the portrayal of crime and justice 
in film.  Dr. Becker’s current research focuses on the creation of hate crime legislation, music and the white racialist 
movement, the sexual exploitation of children online, and environmental inequality in Appalachia.  His previous 
publications have appeared in the International Review of Law, Computers, & Technology, The Justice Professional, 
The Journal of Criminal Justice Education, and the American Journal of Criminal Justice.
Contact information:
Alan S. Bruce, Department of Sociology, Quinnipiac University, 275 Mount Carmel Ave., Hamden, CT 06518. E-
mail: Alan.Bruce@quinnipiac.edu
Paul Becker, Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Work, University of Dayton, 300 College Park, 
Dayton, OH 45469.  E-mail: Paul.Becker@notes.udayton.edu
